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Abstract
In profit and loss sharing contracts, profits are shared according to a specific
ratio while losses are shared according to each partner contribution ration in the
project’s capital. We aim to reduce entrepreneurial effort shirking in a profit and
loss sharing contract involving a VC and an entrepreneur. We use a game theo-
retic approach and try to find the profit-sharing ratio that would reduce the moral
hazard risk of effort shirking. The game theoretic approach allows for the devel-
opment of a profit-sharing ratio span of negotiation that fulfil both the incentive
and participative constraints of the PLS participants
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1. Introduction
The role of VC as a financier for start-ups is increasing. yet the innovative na-
ture of those start-ups carries a great element of failure risk Bergemann and Hege
(1998). The main comparative advantage of VCs over other financing mechanisms
such as debt or angel financing is their expertise. This can help entrepreneur in
improving the strategies and the performance of their work.
Despite this advantage, VC are suffering from asymmetric information in the for-
mal of moral; hazards. For example, problems can arise between entrepreneurs
and VC after a project is being undertaken.
To mitigate against this problem, it is suggested that decision making power
should be balanced by having each party controlling decisions at each stage of
the project life. Aghion and Bolton (1992) ,Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1994),Dessein (2002)
Other forms of dealing with moral hazards urges VC to dictate a rate of return
Mason and Harrison (2002), Manigart et al. (2002). In our case the profit sharing
is negotiated rather than dictated by the VC.
There are also external risks faced by VCs Kaplan and Strömberg (2004). For
example, demand for newly launched products, extent of market competition, as
well as how financial markets are perceived can affect VCs entry and exit stages.
When it comes to tackling the issue of demand, we allow for a flexibility in the
project return. Also, the competition problem is reflected indirectly in the demand
function.
We build a model based on a profit and sharing contract. Profits for each partici-
pant is determined by expected profits and not based on a fixed profit or percentage
of investment. Also, losses are shared based on each participant share of capital,
rather than a fixed loss. This is different form standard VC contracts where a VC
can demand higher part in the case of loss, or even claim the totality of the resid-
ual value of the project.
We try to reduce moral hazards in the form of effort shirking. However there is no
model that can eliminate it , we ca only reduce it Elitzur and Gavious (2003).
Our paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we
provide the methodology. Sction 4 presents a discussion of the results. Section 5
, concludes with possible further extensions.
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2. The model
We aim to reduce entrepreneurial effort shirking in a profit and loss sharing
contract involving a VC and an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is endowed with
an initial wealth and requires additional funding. The entrepreneur can exercise a
hight or low level of effort ei: i ∈ {l, h}. Both levels can determine the level of





where Re , VC are the share of the project output of the entrepreneur and the
VC respectively: Rv such that R = Re+ Rv . the projcets can take two stockastic










Because the output under high effort is assumed to be higher than that under
low effort , we conclude that the cumulative density function based on high effort
on eh first-order stochastically dominates the cdf based on low effort on el:
F (R|eh) ≤ F (R|el) for all R ∈ [R,R]









The Vc has a reservation utility of Uv = 0 while the entrepreneur has a reser-
vation utility of U≥ 0
3. Methodology
We have a one period game where the entrepreneur and the VC have a con-
tractual agreement (x; I, α, β=x)
Where :
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• X = Capital contribution of Vc
• I = Project capital
• β : VC share of loss
• α : VC share of profit
The specific terms of the PLS contracts dictates that the losses cannot exceed
each participant’s percentage share in the capital of the firm.
In exercising a effort the entrepreneur endures a disutility D(ei) : i ∈ {l, h}
depending on the effort levlsuch that D(el) > D(eh). this means that the en-
trepreneurs endures a higher disutility if he/she exercises a higher effort.
the expected cash flows for each participant are given as:
E(Rv) = αE(R);E(Re) = (1− α)E(R) (5)
In order to find the optimal sharing ration of profit, we will construct the model
under two cases: 1)Observable effort and 2) unobservable effort.
4. Results
4.1. 1) Observable effort case
since effort is observed by the Vc, the entrepreneur is committed to perform
a high effort and cannot deviate from such commitment. Therfore the VC would















Taking the First order derivative with respect to Rm and applying lagrange multi-










λ = 1 (6)





Rmf(R|eh)dR−D(eh) = U (7)
Given that the sharing ratios are fixed in advance, we cannot change them in
the due course of the project. Therefore we can safely replace Re by (1 − α) R
and Rm by (1− β) R
Equation 3, then becomes:




Rf(R|eh)dR + (1− β)
∫ I
0
Rf(R|eh)dR−D(eh) = U (8)
The profit-sharing ratio can then be given as:
α = 1−







or in a shorthand formula:
α = 1− U +D(eh)− (1− β)E(R|eh)
E(R|eh)
(10)
4.2. The unobservable effort case
The VC suffers moral hazards as he/she cannot observe the effort of the en-
trepreneur. to assess this problem , the VC establishes two kinds of probabilities:
• Entrepreneur’s type probability θh: This the probability that the entrepreneur
would exercise a high effort
• Performance probability: probability of project success given an effort level
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Due to this asymmetric information case, the Vc is in an informational dis-
advantage while the entrepreneur is in informational advantage and can extract a
private benefit if he/she performs a low effort.
The contract need to take into consideration those specific constraints of the
unobservable effort case:
• Participation constraints PCF and PCM: where both participants (Financier
Manger) are at least breaking even.
• Incentive compatibility constraints ICM: where only the manager is Offred
a profit-sharing ratio that will encourage him to exert high effort rather than
shirking.
Therefore the objective of the VC is to maximise his return while taking into







































The Vc sharing ratio α can be solved using the technique of game theory. We







Rmf(R|eh)dR−D(eh) ≥ U Replacing Rm by (1−
α)R and Rm by (1− β)R . We get:
α ≤ 1−







Or in a shorthand formula
α ≤ αpcm = 1−
U +D(eh)− (1− β)E(R|eh)
E(R|eh)
(16)




α then become :
αinc ≤ 1−
S + ∆D − (1− β)∆R)
∆R
(18)
where: ∆D = D(eh)−D(el); ∆R = E(R|eh)−E(R|el); ∆R = E(R|eh)−
E(R|el)
Therfore we must have
α ≤ min{αice;αpce} (19)
in order for α to fulfil the incentive and participation constraints of the en-
trepreneur
From the Vc point of view, he/ she is in comparative disadvantage and there-
fore his/her main aim is to break even. the sharing ratioαpcf that would allow the























θhg(θh)dθh is the expected probability E(θ) that the entrepreneur
is going to excercise a high effort.
Formalizing the integrals using expected values and replacing Rf by αR and
Rf by βR. we get:
E(θh)[βE(R|eh) + αE(R|eh]) + (1− E(θh)[βE(R|el) + αE(R|el]) ≥ βI
Solving for α we get:
α ≥ αpcf =
B[I − θh∆R− E(R|el)
θh∆R + E(R|el)
(20)
Finally , we need to establish a span of negotiation over the profit sharing ratio.
α has to lie down between two values αpcv and min{αinc;αepc}. or Formally:
αpcf ≤ α ≤ min{αicm;αpcm} (21)
We can then formulate a span of negotiation of the profit-sharing ratio
min{αicm;αpcm} − αpcf (22)
5. Conclusion
We have tried to reduce Moral Hazards (entrepreneurial effort shirking) in a
PLS contract. low effort in this context can lead to a higher probability of the
project’s failure. We used game theory techniques under both observable effort
(symmetric information) and unobservable effort (asymmetric case). We have
managed to establish a span of negotiation around the profit-sharing ratio. This
case allows for more flexibility in the negotiation rather than having the profit-
sharing ratio dictated by the VC. This span of negation satisfies both the incentive
as well as the participation constraints of both parties.
This model can be extended using agent-based simulation. the later will help
calculating optimal profit sharing under different users customised setting.
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